The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

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The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

Author Info

Kóczy,László Á.
Lauwers,Luc (METEOR)

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Abstract

A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core. We provide an algorithm to find the minimal dominant set.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 018.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:umamet:2004018

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Article
- Koczy, Laszlo A. & Lauwers, Luc, 2007. "The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 277-298, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Laszlo A. Koczy & Luc Lauwers, 2004. "The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0421, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Laszlo A. Koczy & Luc Lauwers, 2002. "The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension," Grand Coalition 44, Grand Coalition Web Site. [Downloadable!]
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2003. "The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension," Working Papers 2003.50, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2002. "The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension," Game Theory and Information 0210002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2002. "The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0220, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën. [Downloadable!]

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2004-05-26 (All new papers)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1996. "A Property of the Core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 266-273, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1994. "Viable Proposals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 347-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Laszlo A. Koczy & Luc Lauwers, 2001. "The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible," Grand Coalition 52, Grand Coalition Web Site. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2002. "The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0219, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën. [Downloadable!]
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2001. "The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible," Game Theory and Information 0110001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jun 2002. [Downloadable!]
- Koczy, Laszlo A. & Lauwers, Luc, 2004. "The coalition structure core is accessible," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 86-93, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
E. Kalai & D. Schmeidler, 1975. "An Admissible Set Occurring in Various Bargaining Situations," Discussion Papers 191, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Kalai, Ehud & Schmeidler, David, 1977. "An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 402-411, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Zhou Lin, 1994. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 512-526, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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