Minimal manipulability: Unanimity and Nondictatorship
AbstractThis paper is concerned with the number of profiles at which a nondictatorial social choice function is manipulable. For three or more alternatives the lower bound is derived when the social choice function is nondictatorial and unanimous. In the case of three alternatives the lower bound is also derived when the social choice function is nondictatorial and surjective. In both cases all social choice functions reaching that lower bound are characterized when there are at least three agents. In the case of two agents the characterized social choice functions are only a subset of the set of all social choice functions reaching the minimum.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 005.
Date of creation: 2004
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Other versions of this item:
- Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Minimal manipulability: Unanimity and nondictatorship," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 675-691, August.
- NEP-ALL-2004-03-28 (All new papers)
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- Stefan Maus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2007.
"Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 247-269, September.
- Maus,Stefan & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2005.
"Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability,"
009, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Hans Peters & Souvik Roy & Ton Storcken, 2012. "On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 399-429, July.
- Pritchard, Geoffrey & Wilson, Mark C., 2009. "Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 35-57, July.
- Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September.
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