Constitutional Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences
AbstractA game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable, and sufficient and almost necessary conditions for an arbitrary (but surjective) social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable. It is shown that the results apply to interesting classes of scoring and veto rules.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 025.
Date of creation: 2003
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Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/UMPublications.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2005. "Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 381-396, 09.
- Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2005. "Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12199, Maastricht University.
- Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2003. "Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences," Discussion Paper Series dp323, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- NEP-ALL-2003-03-25 (All new papers)
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