This paper analyzes unifications of nationally defined commercial laws within an elementary non-cooperative game-theoretical framework. In the absence of any coordination, it is far from obvious that nation-states will ever succeed in selecting the very same commercial laws. Yet, as the gains to be reaped by adherence to the same commercial laws may not necessarily be distributed equally among the nation-states involved, coordination may be quite difficult to achieve. In this respect, a nation-state that is better able to spur economic growth than all other nation-states will be able to influence the outcome of any coordination of decisions between nation-states in a profound way. This is because nation-states may voluntarily seek to adopt the legal rules of a nation-state that is strongest able to boost economic growth into a uniform commercial law. Thereby, nation-states may most stimulate their exports to and capital investments from the nation-state that is the strongest engine of economic growth.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number
027.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: