This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Core Concepts for Dynamic TU Games

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Kranich,Laurence
Peree,Andrea
Peters,Hans (METEOR)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the classical core, the strong sequential core and the weak sequential core. The differences between the concepts arise from different interpretations of profitable deviations by coalitions. Sufficient conditions are given for nonemptiness of the classical core in general and of the weak sequential core for the case of two players. Simplifying characterizations of the weak and strong sequential core are provided. Examples highlight the essential difference between these core concepts.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=386
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 013.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:umamet:2001013

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Willy Villevoye).

Related research
Keywords: mathematical economics and econometrics ;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Gale, Douglas, 1978. "The core of a monetary economy without trust," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 456-491, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Becker, Robert A & Chakrabarti, Subir K, 1995. "The Recursive Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 401-23, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, 1998. "A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 563-584. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. P.J.J. Herings & H. Peeters, 2001. "The Strong Sequential Core for Two-period Economies," Microeconomics 0111002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Kannai, Yakar, 1992. "The core and balancedness," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 355-395 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Tjalling C. Koopmans, 1959. "Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impatience," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 81, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 185-87.
  9. Rosenthal, Edward C., 1990. "Monotonicity of solutions in certain dynamic cooperative games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 221-226, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Gordon R. Munro, 1979. "The Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 12(3), pages 355-76, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Rosenthal, E C, 1990. "Monotonicity of the Core and Value in Dynamic Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 45-57.
  12. Jonathan Shalev, 1996. "Loss Aversion and Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 9606001, EconWPA, revised 18 Mar 1997. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Berden, Caroline, 2007. "The Role of Individual Intertemporal Transfers in Dynamic TU-Games," Research Memoranda 030, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  3. D. Bauso & J. Timmer, 2009. "Robust dynamic cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 23-36, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to register as authors.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.