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Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games

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Author Info
Herings,P. Jean-Jacques
Peeters,Ronald J.A.P. (METEOR)

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Abstract

In this paper a selection theory for stochastic games is developed. The theory itself is based on the ideas of Harsanyi and Selton to select equilibria for games in standard form. We introduce several possible definitions for the stochastic tracing procedure, an extension of the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games. We analyze the properties of these alternative definitions. We show that exactly one of the proposed extensions ois consistent with the formulation of Harsanyi-Selten for games in standard form and captures stationarity.

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Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 009.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:umamet:2001009

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Keywords: microeconomics ;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
  3. Herings,P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters,Ronald J.A.P, 2000. "Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games: Structure, Selection, and Computation," Research Memoranda 004, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. McLennan, A., 1999. "The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game," Papers 306, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
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  8. Herings,P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters,R., 1999. "A Differentiable Homotopy to Compute Nash Equilibria of n-Person Games," Research Memoranda 038, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  9. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 191-219, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 2000. "Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1231-1248, September.
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  11. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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