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The Strong Sequential Core for Two-period Economies

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Author Info
Predtetchinski,Arkadi
Herings,Jean-Jacques (METEOR)

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Abstract

The strong sequential core for two-stage economies with a possibly incomplete set of assets in period zero and trade in commodities in period one consists of those goods allocations that are in the classical core and moreover, after realization of the state of nature, in the core of the economy where executed asset contracts serve as initial endowments. The strong sequential core coincides with the classical core when all possible state-contingent contracts may serve as an asset. For finance economies it is shown that the strong sequential core is generically empty when there is an incomplete set of assets. Outside the setting of finance economies, we show that the strong sequential core can be empty even if there is a complete set of assets. If the set of constrained feasible allocations resulting from trading in assets, is enlarged to include also allocations outside the agents'' consumption sets, then a complete set of assets is sufficient for the equivalence of the resulting semi-strong sequential core and the classical core.

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Paper provided by Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization in its series Research Memoranda with number 005.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:umamet:2001005

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Keywords: mathematical economics and econometrics ;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gale, Douglas, 1978. "The core of a monetary economy without trust," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 456-491, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, 1998. "A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 563-584. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Laurence Kranich & Andres Perea & Hans Peters, 2000. "Dynamic Cooperative Games," Discussion Papers 00-06, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
  4. Debreu, Gerard, 1972. "Smooth Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(4), pages 603-15, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "The Core of an Economy with Transaction Costs," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(3), pages 447-58, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Predtetchinski,Arkadi & Herings,Jean-Jacques & Peters,Hans, 2002. "The Strong Sequential Core in a Dynamic Exchange Economy," Research Memoranda 003, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Kranich,Laurence & Peree,Andrea & Peters,Hans, 2001. "Core Concepts for Dynamic TU Games," Research Memoranda 013, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  5. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Francesc Llerena & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2004. "Sequential decisions in allocation problems," Working Papers in Economics 116, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia. [Downloadable!]
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