This paper models the formation of R&D networks in an oligopolistic industry. In particular, it focuses on the coevolutionary process involving firms’ technological capabilities, market structure and the network of interfirm technological agreements.The main result of the paper is that the R&D network can work as a strong selection mechanism in the industry, creating ex post asymmetries among ex ante similar firms. This is due to a self-reinforcing, path-dependent process, in which events in the early stages of the industry affect firms’ survival in the long run. In this framework, both market and technological externalities created by the formation of cooperative agreements play a crucial roe. Although the R&D network creates profound differences at the beginning, which are reflected by an unequal distribution of links, it tends to eliminate them as it becomes denser and denser. The nature of the technological environment affects the speed of the transition and some of the characteristics of the industry in the long run.
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Paper provided by Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology in its series Research Memoranda with number
007.
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Hagedoorn, John & Link, Albert N. & Vonortas, Nicholas S., 2000.
"Research partnerships1,"
Research Policy,
Elsevier, vol. 29(4-5), pages 567-586, April.
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Goyal, Sanjeev & Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose Luis, 2001.
"R&D Networks,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 686-707, Winter.
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