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Author Info
Cowan,Robin
Jonard,Nicolas (MERIT)

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Abstract

This paper is about the behaviour of a society in which learning individuals play a Prisoner’s Dilemma that guides social promotion and demotion. The direct effect of the payoff-based socialization that is implemented here is segregation. However, segregation permits the survival of cooperation as it (unintendedly) preserves cooperators from detrimental interactions with defectors. Very large amounts of cooperation can be observed in the long run.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology in its series Research Memoranda with number 035.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:umamer:2003035

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Keywords: microeconomics ;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2000. "Unfolding Social Hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 177-203, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Durlauf, Steven N, 1993. "Nonergodic Economic Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 349-66, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Eaton, Curtis & Eswaran, Mukesh, 1998. "Endogenous Cartel Formation," Australian Economic Papers, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(1), pages 1-13, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Anderlini, Luca & Ianni, Antonella, 1996. "Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 141-177, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. repec:att:wimass:199612r is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1998. "The Social Selection of Flexible and Rigid Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 63-82, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Robson, Arthur J. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1996. "Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 65-92, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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