Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions
AbstractWe consider effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives. We assume that players have incomplete information with respect to the preferences of the other players. Our main result is the characterization of effectivity functions which have an ex post Nash consistent representation, i.e., there is a game form such that i the distribution of power among coalitions of players is the same as in the effectivity function and ii there is an ex post Nash equilibrium in pure strategiesfor any preference profile.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht : GSBE, Graduate School of Business and Economics in its series Research Memorandum with number 049.
Date of creation: 2013
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Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/UMPublications.htm
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design;
Other versions of this item:
- Vermeulen A.J. & Schröder M.J.W. & Peters H.J.M., 2013. "Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions," Research Memorandum 049, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-10-18 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2013-10-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2013-10-18 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2013-10-18 (Microeconomics)
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