Distance rationalizability of scoring rules
AbstractCollective decision making problems can be seen as finding an outcome that is closest to aconcept of consensus. Nitzan 1981 introduced Closeness to Unanimity Procedure as a first example to this approach and showed that the Borda rule is the closest to unanimity under swap distance a.k.a the Kemeny 1959 distance. Meskanen and Nurmi 2008 shows that the Dodgson rule is the closest to Condorcet under swap distance. Elkind et al. 2009, 2012 generalized this concept as distance-rationalizability, where being close is measured via various distance functions and with many concepts of consensus, e.g., unanimity, Condorcet etc. In this paper, we show that all non-degenerate scoring rules can be distance-rationalized as Closeness to Unanimity procedures under a class of weighted distance functions introduced in Can 2012. Therefore, the results herein generalizes, partly, the results in Nitzan 1981 and complements the extensive findings in Elkind et al. 2009.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht : GSBE, Graduate School of Business and Economics in its series Research Memorandum with number 028.
Date of creation: 2013
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