A delegated agent in a winner-take-all contest
AbstractWe consider a winner-take-all contest extended with a principal-agent re-lationship. One of the two players, say player 1, offers a contract to an agent to act in the contest as a delegate on his behalf. The wage offered to the agent is deliberately chosen by player 1. We characterize the Nash equilibrium of this contest and com-pare its properties with those of the Nash equilibrium of the corresponding standard contest in which both players compete themselves. We show that the expected utility of player 1 is larger in the contest with a delegate if he is strongly risk averse with respect to his money income and moreover the contested prize is large enough.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management) in its series Research Report with number 99B47.
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2004.
"Delegation in a group-contest,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 263-272, March.
- Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2002. "Delegation in a group-contest," Research Report 02F03, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
- Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2002. "Delegation in a group-contest," CCSO Working Papers 200201, University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research.
- Krakel, Matthias & Sliwka, Dirk, 2006.
"Strategic delegation and mergers in oligopolistic contests,"
Journal of Economics and Business,
Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 119-136.
- Matthias Kräkel & Dirk Sliwka, 2002. "Strategic Delegation and Mergers in Oligopolistic Contests," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse2_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Gürtler, Oliver, 2006. "Contractual Incentive Provision and Commitment in Rent-Seeking Contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 100, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Müller, Wieland, 2000.
"Divisionalization in contests,"
SFB 373 Discussion Papers
2000,9, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Lambert Schoonbeek, 2007.
"Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest,"
Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 453-464, June.
- Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2006. "Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest," Research Report 06C11, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
- Christian Rusche, 2011. "Does Delegation Help to Prevent Spiteful Behavior?," Ruhr Economic Papers 0270, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joke Bulthuis).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.