Delegation in a group-contest
AbstractIt is known that the option of delegation in a rent-seeking contest between two individuals leads to a prisoner’s dilemma. In equilibrium no player hires a delegate, while it is Pareto-efficient if both would hire one. This paper shows that this result does not generalize to a contest between the members of two groups. We further provide the conditions under which zero, one, or both groups hire a delegate in equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management) in its series Research Report with number 02F03.
Date of creation: 2002
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