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Delegation in a group-contest

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  • Schoonbeek, Lambert

    (Groningen University)

Abstract

It is known that the option of delegation in a rent-seeking contest between two individuals leads to a prisoner’s dilemma. In equilibrium no player hires a delegate, while it is Pareto-efficient if both would hire one. This paper shows that this result does not generalize to a contest between the members of two groups. We further provide the conditions under which zero, one, or both groups hire a delegate in equilibrium.

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File URL: http://irs.ub.rug.nl/ppn/238231593
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management) in its series Research Report with number 02F03.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:rugsom:02f03

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  1. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May.
  2. Warneryd, Karl, 2000. "In Defense of Lawyers: Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 145-158, October.
  3. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  4. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. " Rent-Seeking with Non-identical Sharing Rules," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 43-50, August.
  5. Lambert Schoonbeek, 2002. "A delegated agent in a winner-takes-all contest," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 21-23.
  6. Hwan Baik, Kyung & Lee, Sanghack, 1997. "Collective rent seeking with endogenous group sizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 121-130, February.
  7. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-34, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Christian Rusche, 2011. "Does Delegation Help to Prevent Spiteful Behavior?," Ruhr Economic Papers, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen 0270, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  2. Sami Dakhlia & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Rent-seeking with scarce talent: a model of preemptive hiring," Microeconomics, EconWPA 0505002, EconWPA.
  3. Gürtler, Oliver, 2006. "Contractual Incentive Provision and Commitment in Rent-Seeking Contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University 100, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  4. Stefan Brandauer & Florian Englmaier, 2009. "A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 205-232, September.
  5. Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2006. "Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest," Research Report, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management) 06C11, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).

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