Equilibrium properties of finite binary choice games
AbstractIn this paper I derive a complete characterization for the equilibria that may arise in a binary choice interaction model with a ?nite number of interacting agents. In particular, the correspondence between the interaction strength, the number of agents and the set of equilibria is derived.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research in its series CCSO Working Papers with number 200314.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Adriaan R. Soetevent, 2004. "Equilibrium Properties of Finite Binary Choice Games," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 157, Society for Computational Economics.
- C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
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- Yannis M. Ioannides, 2004.
"Topologies Of Social Interactions,"
Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings
287, Econometric Society.
- Yannis Ioannides, 2001. "Topologies of Social Interactions," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0104, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
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