License auctions when winning bids are financed through debt
AbstractWe study an auction where two licenses to operate on a new market are sold. Winners finance their bids on a competitive debt market. Due to limited liability, the amount of debt affects their behavior on the product market. In equilibrium, consumer prices are lower than with a beauty contest, where firms obtain their licenses for free. Winning bids are lower than in a model where firms have internal funds. Higher bids cannot be financed due to credit rationing. Expected net firm profits are strictly positive, although firms are a priori identical and have the same information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research in its series CCSO Working Papers with number 200310.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Marco A. Haan & Linda A. Toolsema, 2011. "License Auctions When Winning Bids Are Financed Through Debt," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 254-281, 06.
- Haan, M.A. & Toolsema, L.A., 2006. "License auctions when winning bids are financed through debt," Research Report 06F06, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
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