This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Delegation in a group-contest

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Schoonbeek, Lambert (Groningen University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

It is known that the option of delegation in a rent-seeking contest between two individuals leads to a prisoner\'s dilemma. In equilibrium no player hires a delegate, while it is Pareto-efficient if both would hire one. This paper shows that this result does not generalize to a contest between the members of two groups. We further provide the conditions under which zero, one, or both groups hire a delegate in equilibrium.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://irs.ub.rug.nl/ppn/241144159
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research in its series CCSO Working Papers with number 200201.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:rugccs:200201

Contact details of provider:
Postal: PO Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen
Phone: +31 50 363 7185
Fax: +31 50 363 3720
Email:
Web page: http://ccso.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Joke Bulthuis).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Oliver Gürtler, 2006. "Contractual Incentive Provision and Commitment in Rent-Seeking Contests," Discussion Papers 100, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lambert Schoonbeek, 2007. "Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 453-464, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Stefan Brandauer & Florian Englmaier, 2006. "A Model of Strategic Delegation in Contests between Groups," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Sami Dakhlia & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Rent-seeking with scarce talent: a model of preemptive hiring," Microeconomics 0505002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over five million full texts a year are downloaded through IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.