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Inflation in developing countries: does Central Bank independence matter?

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Author Info
Sturm, Jan-Egbert
Haan, Jakob de (Groningen University)

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Abstract

Abstract We analyse whether central bank independence (CBI) affects inflation in developing countries. For this purpose we have constructed a new data set for the turnover rate (TOR) of central bank governors for a very large sample of countries, which also covers the 1990s. We find that once various control variables are included, the CBI proxy is often not significant. We also conclude that in those regressions in which the CBI proxy is significant, the coefficient of the TOR becomes significant only after high inflation countries are added to the sample.

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Paper provided by University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research in its series CCSO Working Papers with number 200101.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:rugccs:200101

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Forder, James, 1996. "On the Assessment and Implementation of 'Institutional' Remedies," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(1), pages 39-51, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Marta Campillo & Jeffrey A. Miron, 1996. "Why Does Inflation Differ Across Countries?," NBER Working Papers 5540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Temple, Jonathan, 1998. "Central bank independence and inflation: good news and bad news," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 215-219, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
  5. Romer, David, 1993. "Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(4), pages 869-903, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Haan, Jakob de & Kooi, Willem J., 2000. "Does central bank independence really matter?: New evidence for developing countries using a new indicator," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 643-664, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
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  8. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001. " Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  1. Carlos de Resende, 2007. "Cross-Country Estimates of the Degree of Fiscal Dominance and Central Bank Independence," Working Papers 07-36, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kees Bouwman & Richard Jong-A-Pin & Jakob de Haan, 2005. "On the relationship between central bank independence and inflation: some more bad news," Applied Financial Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 1(6), pages 381-385, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Fernando M. Gonçalves & Márcio Holland & Andrei D. Spacov, 2005. "Can Jurisdictional Uncertainty And Capital Controls Explain The High Level Of Real Interest Rates In Brazil? Evidence From Panel Data," Anais do XXXIII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 33th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 028, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Marc-André Gosselin, 2007. "Central Bank Performance under Inflation Targeting," Working Papers 07-18, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2005. "Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 57, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Alpanda, Sami & Honig, Adam, 2007. "Political Monetary Cycles and a New de facto Ranking of Central Bank Independence," MPRA Paper 5898, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Aleksandra Maslowska, 2008. "Quest for the best: How to measure central bank independence and show its relation with inflation?," Discussion Papers 37, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Carlos De Resende & Nooman Rebei, 2008. "The Welfare Implications of Fiscal Dominance," Working Papers 08-28, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  9. Jean-Francois Segalotto & Marco Arnone & Bernard Laurens, 2006. "Measures of Central Bank Autonomy: Empirical Evidence for OECD, Developing, and Emerging Market Economies," IMF Working Papers 06/228, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  10. Oya Celasun & Gaston R. Gelos & Alessandro Prati, 2004. "Obstacles to Disinflation: What is the Role of Fiscal Expectations?," IMF Working Papers 04/111, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Ulrich H. Klueh & Peter Stella, 2008. "Central Bank Financial Strength and Policy Performance: An Econometric Evaluation," IMF Working Papers 08/176, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  12. Doyle, Matthew & Falk, Barry L., 2006. "Do Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences Help Explain Observed Inflation Outcomes?," Staff General Research Papers 12501, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Stefan Krause & Fabio Mendez, 2005. "Institutions, Arrangements, and Preferences for Inflation Stability: Evidence and Lessons from a Panel Data Analysis," Emory Economics 0501, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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