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Auctions with rent seeking

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  • Haan, Marco
  • Schoonbeek, Lambert

    (Groningen University)

Abstract

We present a model which combines elements of an auction and a rent-seeking contest. Players compete for a prize. Apart from exerting lobbying efforts, they also have to submit a bid which is payable only if they win the prize. First, we analyze the model if the returns-to-scale parameters of both bids and efforts are unity. We present a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. In the equilibrium each player submits the same bid, while the sum of all efforts equals that bid. Second, we analyze the case in which the returns-to-scale parameters may differ from unity, and derive the implications of that specification.

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File URL: http://irs.ub.rug.nl/ppn/241225965
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Paper provided by University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research in its series CCSO Working Papers with number 200005.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:rugccs:200005

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  1. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction," Papers 9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  2. Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1996. " Auctions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(4), pages 367-420, December.
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