Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Asymmetric information, option to wait to invest and the optimal level of investment

Contents:

Author Info

  • Lensink, Robert
  • Sterken, Elmer

    (Groningen University)

Abstract

This paper analyzes equilibrium rationing on credit markets in the case of gains from waiting to acquire information about the future profitability of investment. We compare the competitive outcome with the socially optimal level of investment. We show that the opportunity to postpone investment changes the nature of the inefficiencies of the competitive outcome fundamentally. Without the option to wait, high risk firms tend to invest and the outcome is characterized by a situation of underinvestment. If firms can wait high risk firms benefit the most from waiting. In this case low risk firms tend to invest immediately and a situation of overinvestment will result, since from the banks' point of view firms do not delay enough.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://irs.ub.rug.nl/ppn/241132908
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research in its series CCSO Working Papers with number 199917.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:rugccs:199917

Contact details of provider:
Postal: PO Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen
Phone: +31 50 363 7185
Fax: +31 50 363 3720
Email:
Web page: http://ccso.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Boyd, John H. & Prescott, Edward C., 1986. "Financial intermediary-coalitions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 211-232, April.
  2. Gale, William G., 1990. "Federal lending and the market for credit," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 177-193, July.
  3. N. Gregory Mankiw, 1986. "The Allocation of Credit and Financial Collapse," NBER Working Papers 1786, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
  5. Pindyck, Robert S, 1982. "Adjustment Costs, Uncertainty, and the Behavior of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 415-27, June.
  6. Gale, William G, 1991. "Economic Effects of Federal Credit Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 133-52, March.
  7. Williamson, Stephen D, 1988. "Liquidity, Banking, and Bank Failures," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(1), pages 25-43, February.
  8. De Meza, David & Webb, David C., 1988. "Credit market efficiency and tax policy in the presence of screening costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-22, June.
  9. Ramakrishnan, Ram T S & Thakor, Anjan V, 1984. "Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 415-32, July.
  10. Abel, Andrew B, 1983. "Optimal Investment under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 228-33, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Rainer Niemann & Caren Sureth, 2005. "Capital Budgeting with Taxes under Uncertainty and Irrevesibility," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, vol. 225(1), pages 77-95, January.
  2. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00112522 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Paolo M. Panteghini, 2002. "On Debt Financing and Investment Timing," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 110-114, Autumn.
  4. Paul Belleflamme & Martin Peitz, 2009. "Asymmetric Information and Overinvestment in Quality," CESifo Working Paper Series 2619, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Rainer Niemann & Caren Sureth, 2002. "Taxation under Uncertainty – Problems of Dynamic Programming and Contingent Claims Analysis in Real Option Theory," CESifo Working Paper Series 709, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Caren Sureth, 2002. "Partially Irreversible Investment Decisions and Taxation under Uncertainty: A Real Option Approach," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(2), pages 185-221, 05.
  7. Aktham Maghyereh, 2005. "Dynamic Capital Structure: Evidence From The Small Developing Country Of Jordan," IIUM Journal of Economics and Management, IIUM Journal of Economis and Management, vol. 13(1), pages 1-32, June.
  8. Jean-Bernard Chatelain, 2003. "Structural Modelling of Financial Constraints on Investment: Where Do We Stand?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00112522, HAL.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dgr:rugccs:199917. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joke Bulthuis).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.