On the equivalence of selected supply chain contract mechanisms
AbstractThis paper models a situation where a Supplier sells a fashion product to a Buyer who in turn sells the product to the consumers. Both the Supplier and the Buyer set their own selling price. For the above setting this paper designs different contract mechanisms such as Revenue sharing, Profit sharing, Quantity discounts, License fee and Mail-in-rebate contract mechanisms. The paper shows that the designed contract mechanism can provide both coordination and win-win. The paper also establishes the equivalence between the designed contract mechanisms and argues that industries can use one mechanism over the other in case of implementation problem.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Nyenrode Business Universiteit in its series Nyenrode Research Papers Series with number 05-08.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.library.nyenrode.nl
Coordination; Win-Win; Supply Chain Contracts; Mail-in-rebates;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2006-05-27 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2006-05-27 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2006-05-27 (Industrial Organization)
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