This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Semi-Public Contests Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Prüfer, J. (Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
No abstract is available for
this item.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download . To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center in its series Discussion Paper with number
2008-023.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2008Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2008023Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Corry Stuyts).
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Dubra, Juan, 2006.
"A correction to uniqueness in "Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information" ,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 56-60, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996.
"The all-pay auction with complete information (*) ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
Other versions:
Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & Vries, Casper de, 1995.
"The All-pay Auction with Complete Information ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995.
"The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information ,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992.
"The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information ,"
Papers
8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991.
"The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information ,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1007, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Varies, C.G., 1990.
"The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information ,"
Papers
9051, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
Bruno Biais & Enrico Perotti, 2008.
"Entrepreneurs and new ideas ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 1105-1125.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Biais, Bruno & Perotti, Enrico C, 2003.
"Entrepreneurs and New Ideas ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3864, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Biais, Bruno & Perotti, Enrico, 2008.
"Entrepreneurs and New Ideas ,"
IDEI Working Papers
347, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 0000.
[Downloadable!] Campbell, Colin M. & Levin, Dan, 2000.
"Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions? ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 106-120, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Felli, Leonardo & Roberts, Kevin W S, 2002.
"Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3535, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2001.
"Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? ,"
STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series
414, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
[Downloadable!] Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, .
"Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? ,"
CARESS Working Papres
00-04, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!] Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, .
"Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? ,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
4a7d448e61f494c5472087aed, Penn Economics Department.
[Downloadable!] Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2000.
"Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1714, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!] Felli, L. & Roberts, K., 2000.
"Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem? ,"
Economics Papers
2000-w11, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
Felli, Leonhardo & Roberts, Kevin, 2000.
"Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem? ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!] Richard L. Fullerton & Bruce G. Linster & Michael McKee & Stephen Slate, 2002.
"Using Auctions To Reward Tournament Winners: Theory and Experimental Investigations ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 62-84, Spring.
Victor A. Ginsburgh & Jan C. van Ours, 2003.
"Expert Opinion and Compensation: Evidence from a Musical Competition ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 289-296, March.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Full
references
Access and
download statistics Did you know? IDEAS indexes over 800000 items of research in Economics alone.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .