A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Mergers and Trade Liberalization
AbstractThis paper uses a dynamic dominant-firm model with an endogenous merger process to examine the effects of trade liberalization on industry structure. Domestic and cross-border mergers and demergers are allowed for. When firms are myopic and the dominant firm has a sufficiently high pre-merger capital share in any one country, trade liberalization causes the industry to become significantly more concentrated. When firms are forward-looking, this anti-competitive effect of trade liberalization is mitigated. Tariff reduction from a prohibitive to a non-prohibitive level aligns merger patterns across countries and initiates merger (or demerger) waves simultaneously across countries, provided all firms are equally forward-looking. When the dominant firm is more forward-looking than the fringe, however, this result may be reversed. These results, thus, highlight the importance of taking into consideration existing industry structure and firms' discount rates whilst formulating competition policy in the face of trade liberalization.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center in its series Discussion Paper with number 2008-005.
Date of creation: 2008
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Other versions of this item:
- Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Mergers and Trade Liberalization," Discussion Paper 2008-22, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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