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Price Discrimination Bans on Dominant Firms

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  • Degryse, H.A.

    (Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center)

Abstract

Competition authorities and regulatory agencies sometimes impose pricing restrictions on firms with substantial market power — the “dominant” firms. We analyze the welfare effects of a ban on behaviour-based price discrimination in a two-period setting where the market displays a competitive and a sheltered segment. A ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers” decreases prices in the sheltered segment, relaxes competition in the competitive segment, increases the rival’s profits, and may harm the dominant firm’s profits. We show that a ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers” increases the dominant firm’s share of the first-period market. A ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” decreases prices in the competitive segment, lowers the rival’s profits, and augments the consumer surplus. In particular, while second-period competition is relaxed by a ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers”, first-period competition is intensified substantially, which leads to lower prices “on-average” over the two periods. Our findings indicate that a dynamic two-period analysis may lead to conclusions opposite to those drawn from a static one-period analysis.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center in its series Discussion Paper with number 2008-001.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2008001

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Web page: http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/

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  1. Thisse, J.-F. & Vives, X., 1987. "On the strategic choice of spatial price policy," CORE Discussion Papers 1987008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Huw Dixon & Joshy Easaw, 2001. "Strategic Responses to Regulatory Policies: What Lessons Can Be Learned from the U.K. Contract Gas Market?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 379-396, June.
  3. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 1993. "Price Discrimination, Competition and Regulation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 335-59, December.
  4. Bester, H. & Petrakis, E., 1994. "Coupons and Oligopolistic Price Discrimination," Discussion Paper 1994-12, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Armstrong, Mark, 2006. "Price discrimination," MPRA Paper 4693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Yongmin Chen, 2008. "DYNAMIC PRICE DISCRIMINATION WITH ASYMMETRIC FIRMS -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 729-751, December.
  7. Stole, Lars A., 2007. "Price Discrimination and Competition," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
  8. Phlips, Louis & Moras, Ireneo Miguel, 1993. "The AKZO Decision: A Case of Predatory Pricing?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 315-21, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Oz Shy & Rune Stenbacka, 2011. "Customer recognition and competition," Working Papers 11-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.

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