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Public-to-Private Transactions: LBOs, MBOs, MBIs and IBOs

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  • Renneboog, L.D.R.
  • Simons, T.

    (Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center)

Abstract

This paper shows that a vibrant and economically important public-to-private market has reemerged in the US, UK and Continental Europe, since the second half of the 1990s.The paper shows recent trends and investigates the motives for public-to-private and LBO transactions.The reasons for the potential sources of shareholder wealth effects during the transaction period are examined: a distinction is made between tax benefits, incentive realignment, transaction costs savings, stakeholder expropriation, takeover defenses and corporate undervaluation.The paper also attempts to relate these value drivers to the post-transaction value and to the duration of the private status.Finally, the paper draws some conclusions about whether or not public-to-private transactions are useful devices for corporate restructuring.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center in its series Discussion Paper with number 2005-023.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2005023

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Hamid Mehran & Stavros Peristiani, 2009. "Financial visibility and the decision to go private," Staff Reports 376, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  2. Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, 2008. "Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 14(4), pages 792-819.
  3. Shourun Guo & Edie S. Hotchkiss & Weihong Song, 2008. "Do Buyouts (Still) Create Value?," NBER Working Papers 14187, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Sabri Boubaker & Alexis Cellier & Wael Rouatbi, 2014. "The sources of shareholder wealth gains from going private transactions: The role of controlling shareholders," Working Papers 2014-186, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  5. Valkama, Petri & Maula, Markku & Nikoskelainen, Erkki & Wright, Mike, 2013. "Drivers of holding period firm-level returns in private equity-backed buyouts," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 2378-2391.
  6. Szilagyi, P.G., 2007. "Corporate Governance and the Agency Costs of Debt and Outside Equity," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-321510, Tilburg University.
  7. Renneboog, Luc & Simons, Tomas & Wright, Mike, 2007. "Why do public firms go private in the UK? The impact of private equity investors, incentive realignment and undervaluation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 591-628, September.
  8. Thorsten Knauer & Friedrich Sommer, 2012. "Interest barrier rules as a response to highly leveraged transactions: Evidence from the 2008 German business tax reform," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 11(2), pages 206-232, May.
  9. Toby Stuart & Soojin Yim, 2008. "Board Interlocks and the Propensity to be Targeted in Private Equity Transactions," NBER Working Papers 14189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Sharon Katz, 2008. "Earnings Quality and Ownership Structure: The Role of Private Equity Sponsors," NBER Working Papers 14085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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