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Potential maximizers and network formation

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Author Info
Slikker, M.
Dutta, B.
Nouweland, A van den (Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration)

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Abstract

In this paper we study the formation of cooperation structures in superadditive cooperative TU-games. Cooperation structures are represented by hypergraphs. The formation process is modelled as a game in strategic form, where the payoffs are determined according to a weighted (extended) Myerson value. This class of solution concepts turns out to be the unique class resulting in weighted potential games. The argmax set of the weighted potential predicts the formation of the complete structure and structures payoff-equivalent to the complete structure. As by-products we obtain a representation theorem of weighted potential games in terms of weighted Shapley values and a characterization of the weighted (extended) Myerson values.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration in its series Research Memorandum with number 758.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubrem:1998758

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Robert J. Weber, 1977. "Probabilistic Values for Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 471R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983. "On Weighted Shapley Values," Discussion Papers 602, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stef Tijs & Anne van den Nouweland & Bhaskar Dutta, 1998. "Link formation in cooperative situations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 245-256. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules," Discussion Papers 363, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Discussion Papers 246, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  7. Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1996. "Endogenous Formation of Cooperation Structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 218-226, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2003. "On cooperation structures resulting from simultaneous proposals," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(5), pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]
  2. Frank Page & Myrna Wooders, 2007. "Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games," Caepr Working Papers 2007-020, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2003. "On potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(12), pages 1-11. [Downloadable!]
  4. Slikker, M., 1999. "Coalition formation and potential games," Discussion Paper 83, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Anne van den Nouweland, 2004. "The Formation of Communication Networks in Cooperative Games," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2004-2, University of Oregon Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  6. Slikker, M. & Nouweland, A. van den, 1997. "A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division," Discussion Paper 23, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin & James E. Parco & Amnon Rapoport, 2004. "Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation," Working Papers 2004.82, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Gilles, R.P. & Sarangi, S., 2004. "Social network formation with consent," Discussion Paper 70, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  9. Arnold, Tone & Wooders, Myrna, 2002. "Dynamic Club Formation With Coordination," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 640, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Slikker, M. & Gilles, R. & Norde, H. & Tijs, S., 2000. "Directed communication networks," Discussion Paper 84, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  11. Filippo VERGARA CAFFARELLI, 2004. "Non-Cooperative Network Formation with Network Maintenance Costs," Economics Working Papers ECO2004/18, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
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