Bapat, R.B. Tijs, S. (Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration)
Abstract
We consider the two-person zero-sum game in which the strategy sets for Players I and II consist of the vertices and the edges of a directed graph respectively. If Player I chooses vertex v and Player II chooses edge e; then the payoff is zero if v and e are not incident and otherwise it is 1 or _1 according as e originates or terminates at v: We obtain an explicit expression for the value of this game and describe the structure of optimal strategies. A similar problem is considered for undirected graphs and it is shown to be related to the theory of 2-matchings in graphs.
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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration in its series Research Memorandum with number
716.
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Hendrickx, Ruud & Borm, Peter & Brink, Rene van den & Owen, Guillermo, 2005.
"The V L value for network games,"
Discussion Paper
65, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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