This paper focuses on the subclass of cooperative games with stochastic payoffs in which the preferences of the agents are such that a stochastic payoff can be represented by a deterministic equivalent. To each game within this class one can associate a game with deterministic payoffs. It is shown that the core of such a cooperative game with stochastic payoffs is nonempty if and only if the core of the associated game is nonempty.
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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration in its series Research Memorandum with number
713.
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