Raalte, C.L.J.P. van Webers, H.M. (Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration)
Abstract
This paper analyzes the spatial competition in commission fees between two match makers. These match makers serve as middlemen between buyers and sellers who are located uniformly on a circle. The profits of the match makers are determined by their respective market sizes. A limited willingness to pay is incorporated by means of reservation prices. If the fraction of buyers and sellers is unequal, the match makers are willing to subsidize the short side of the market, while the long side is exploited completely, provided reservation prices are sufficiently high. Competition is then concentrated entirely on the short side. When reservation prices are low, two local monopolies will emerge.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration in its series Research Memorandum with number
702.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Hamilton, J.H. & Macleod, W.P. & Thisse, J.F., 1988.
"Spatial Competition And The Core,"
Papers
88-6, Florida - College of Business Administration.
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