Games associated to congestion situations a la Rosenthal (1973) have pure Nash equilibria. This result implicitly relies on the existence of a potential function. In this paper we will provide a characterization of potential games in terms of coordination games and dummy games. Secondly, we extend Rosenthal's congestion model to an incomplete information setting, and show that the related Bayesian games are potential games and therefore have pure Bayesian equilibria.
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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration in its series Research Memorandum with number
689.
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