Bankruptcy and the Per Capita Nucleolus
AbstractAbstract: This article characterizes the per capita nucleolus for bankruptcy games as a bankruptcy rule. This rule, called the cligths rule, is based on the wellknown constrained equal awards principle. The essential feature of the rule however is that, for each bankruptcy problem, it takes into account a vector of clights. These clights only depend on the vector of claims while the height of the estate determines whether the clights should be interpreted as modified claims or as rights. Finally, it is seen that both the clights rule and the Aumann-Maschler rule can be captured within the family of so-called claim and right rules.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2013-059.
Date of creation: 2013
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Bankruptcy; (per capita) nucleolus;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2013-11-16 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-GTH-2013-11-16 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Groote Schaarsberg, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Reijnierse, J.H., 2012. "Interactive Purchasing Situations," Discussion Paper 2012-035, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
- Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
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