On Solving Liability Problems
AbstractAbstract: This paper introduces liability problems, as a generalization of bankruptcy problems, where every agent not only owns a certain amount of cash money, but also has outstanding claims and debts towards the other agents. Assuming that the agents want to cash their claims, we will analyze liability rules which prescribe how the total available amount of cash should be allocated among the agents. In particular we focus on bankruptcy rule based bilateral transfer schemes. Existence of these schemes is established and it is seen that within the class of hierarchical liability problems, such a transfer scheme is unique. Although in general a bankruptcy rule based bilateral transfer scheme need not be unique, we show that the resulting bankruptcy rule based transfer allocation is. This leads to the definition of bankruptcy rule based liability rules. For hierarchical liability problems an alternative characterization of such liability rules is provided. Moreover it is shown that the axiomatic characterization of the Aumann-Maschler bankruptcy rule on the basis of consistency can be extended to the corresponding liability rule. We conclude with a discussion of alternative approaches to solve liability problems.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2013-033.
Date of creation: 2013
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Liability problems; bankruptcy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-24 (All new papers)
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