Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Anonymous Markets
AbstractAbstract: We study the effects of improvements in eBay’s rating mechanism on seller exit and continuing sellers’ behavior. Following a large sample of sellers over time, we exploit the fact that the rating mechanism was changed to reduce strategic bias in buyer rating. That improvement did not lead to increased exit of poorly rated sellers. Yet, buyer valuation of the staying sellers—especially the poorly rated ones—improved significantly. By our preferred interpretation, the latter effect results from increased seller effort; also, when sellers have the choice between exiting (a reduction in adverse selection) and improved behavior (a reduction in moral hazard), then they prefer the latter because of lower cost.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2013-032.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
Anonymous markets; adverse selection; moral hazard; reputation building mechanisms;
Other versions of this item:
- Klein, Tobias J. & Lambertz, Christian & Stahl, Konrad O., 2013. "Adverse selection and moral hazard in anonymous markets," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-050, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Klein, Tobias & Lambertz, Christian & Stahl, Konrad O, 2013. "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Anonymous Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 9501, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-06-16 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IND-2013-06-16 (Industrial Organization)
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