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Inferring Hawks and Doves from Voting Records

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  • Eijffinger, S.C.W.
  • Mahieu, R.J.
  • Raes, L.B.D.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

Abstract: We analyze revealed policy preferences in monetary policy committees. From the voting records of the Bank of England we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We analyze systematic patterns in these policy preferences. We find that internal committee members tend to hold centrist policy preferences while pronounced policy preferences are generally held by external members. Committee members with a career in academia and the industry hold more diverse policy preferences whereas committee members with central bank experience exhibit little heterogeneity in preferences. The median voter does not vary systematically according to career background.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2013-024.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2013024

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

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Keywords: Voting records; Central Banking; Committees; Ideal points;

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Cited by:
  1. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Mahieu, Ronald J & Raes, Louis, 2013. "Estimating the preferences of central bankers: an analysis of four voting records," CEPR Discussion Papers 9602, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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