Business Associations and Private Ordering
AbstractAbstract: We study the capacity of business associations - private, formal, noncommercial organizations designed to promote the common business interests of their members - to support contract enforcement and collective action. Inspired by recent empirical literature, our theoretical framework connects the organizational and institutional features of formal and informal business organization with socioeconomic distance. We show how associations provide value to their members even if members are already embedded in social networks, and which players join an association. We propose explanations for empirical puzzles, put forward novel testable hypotheses, and relate business associations to alternative private ordering institutions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2012-094.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
Business Associations; Trade Associations; Economic Governance; Private Ordering; Arbitration;
Other versions of this item:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs
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