A Strategic Foundation for Proper Equilibrium
AbstractAbstract: Proper equilbrium plays an importent role in the literature on non-cooperative games. The underlying thought experiment is, however, unsatisfying, as it gives no justification for its fundamental idea that severe mistakes are made with a significantly smaller probability than innocuous ones. In this paper we provide a justification for this idea based on strategic choices of the players. In this way we provide a strategic foundation for proper equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2012-093.
Date of creation: 2012
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
proper equilibrium; fall back proper equilibrium;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-12-15 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-12-15 (Microeconomics)
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