Fall Back Equilibrium for 2 x n Bimatrix Games
AbstractAbstract: In this paper we provide a characterisation of the set of fall back equilibria for 2 x n bimatrix games. Furthermore, for this type of games we discuss the relation between the set of fall back equilibria and the sets of perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria. In order to do this we reformulate the existing characterizations for these three equilibrium concepts by the use of refinement-specific subgames.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2012-044.
Date of creation: 2012
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game theory; fall back equilibrium; 2 x n bimatrix game; equilibrium refinement;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-06-13 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-06-13 (Microeconomics)
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- John Kleppe & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx, 2013. "Fall back equilibrium for $$2 \times n$$ bimatrix games," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 171-186, October.
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