Adverse Selection Without Single Crossing
AbstractSome results can be readily applied. For example, overinsurance, i.e. insurance levels above first best as in 'Cadillac' insurance plans, can be rationalized. In a non-linear pricing framework, the model also provides an explanation for marginal prices below marginal costs as observed in flat rate offers.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2011-123.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
adverse selection; single crossing; Spence-Mirrlees condition; global incentive compatibility;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-12-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-12-19 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2011-12-19 (Microeconomics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.