Monotonic Stable Solutions for Minimum Coloring Games
AbstractFor the class of minimum coloring games (introduced by Deng et al. (1999)) we investigate the existence of population monotonic allocation schemes (introduced by Sprumont (1990)). We show that a minimum coloring game on a graph G has a population monotonic allocation scheme if and only if G is (P4, 2K2)-free (or, equivalently, if its complement graph G is quasi-threshold). Moreover, we provide a procedure that for these graphs always selects an integer population monotonic allocation scheme.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2011-016.
Date of creation: 2011
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Minimum coloring game; population monotonic allocation scheme; (P4; 2K2)-free graph; quasi-threshold graph;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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- Platz, T.T. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2013. "On Games Arising From Multi-Depot Chinese Postman Problems," Discussion Paper 2013-005, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Hamers, H.J.M. & Josune Albizuri, M., 2013. "Graphs Inducing Totally Balanced and Submodular Chinese Postman Games," Discussion Paper 2013-006, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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