'The Voracity Effect' and Climate Change: The Impact of Clean Technologies
AbstractIn the absence of a successful international cooperative agreement over the control of emissions there is a growing interest in the role that clean technologies may play to alleviate the climate change problem. Within a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game, we investigate, analytically and within a numerical example based on empirical evidence, the impact of the adoption of a cleaner technology (i.e., a decrease in the emission to output ratio). We show that countries may respond by increasing their emissions resulting in an increase in the stock of pollution that may be detrimental to welfare. This possibility is shown to arise for a signi cant and empirically relevant range of parameters. It is when the damage and/or the initial stock of pollution are relatively large and when the natural rate of decay of pollution is relatively small that the perverse e¤ect of clean technologies is strongest. Cooperation over the control of emissions is necessary to ensure that the development of cleaner technologies does not exacerbate the free riding behavior that is at the origin of the climate change problem.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2010-97.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
transboundary pollution; renewable resource; climate change; clean technolo- gies; differential games;
Other versions of this item:
- Benchekroun, H. & Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2009. "On Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Game," Discussion Paper 2009-23, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Hassan Benchekroun & Amrita Ray Chaudhuri, 2011. "“The Voracity Effect” and Climate Change: The Impact of Clean Technologies," Working Papers 2011.05, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- BENCHEKROUN, Hassan & RAY CHAUDHURI, Amrita, 2010. "'The Voracity Effect' and Climate Change : The Impact of Clean Technologies," Cahiers de recherche 16-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2010-09-18 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-ENE-2010-09-18 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2010-09-18 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ngo Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2006.
"Insecure property rights and growth: the role of appropriation costs, wealth effects, and heterogeneity,"
Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 513-529, 08.
- Ngo Van Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2004. "Insecure Property Rights and Growth: The Roles of Appropriation Costs, Wealth Effects, and Heterogeneity," CESifo Working Paper Series 1253, CESifo Group Munich.
- Philip R. Lane & Aaron Tornell, 1999. "The Voracity Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 22-46, March.
- Rubio, Santiago J. & Casino, Begona, 2002. "A note on cooperative versus non-cooperative strategies in international pollution control," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 251-261, June.
- Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, October.
- Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
- Jorgensen, Steffen & Zaccour, Georges, 2001. "Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(12), pages 1973-1987, December.
- Scott Barrett, 2006. "Climate Treaties and "Breakthrough" Technologies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 22-25, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.