Financial Expertise as an Arms Race
AbstractWe propose a model in which firms involved in trading securities overinvest in financial expertise. Intermediaries or traders in the model meet and bargain over a financial asset. As in the bargaining model in Dang (2008), counterparties endogenously decide whether to acquire information, and improve their bargaining positions, even though the information creates adverse selection. We add to this setting the concept of "financial expertise" as resources invested to lower the cost of later acquiring information about the value of the asset being traded. These investments are made before the parties know about their role in the bargaining game, as proposer or responder, buyer or seller. A prisoner's dilemma arises because investments to lower information acquisition costs improve bargaining outcomes given the other party's information costs, even though the information has no social benefit. These investments lead to breakdowns in trade, or liquidity crises, in response to random but infrequent increases in asset volatility
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2010-87S.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
Financial services; over-the-counter markets; financial crisis;
Other versions of this item:
- G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 345-64, July.
- Robert Hauswald & Robert Marquez, 2006. "Competition and Strategic Information Acquisition in Credit Markets," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 967-1000.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Biais, Bruno & Foucault, Thierry & Moinas, Sophie, 2013.
"Equilibrium Fast Trading,"
TSE Working Papers
13-387, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Philip Bond & Yaron Leitner, 2013. "Market run-ups, market freezes, inventories, and leverage," Working Papers 13-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, revised 04 Feb 2014.
- Marco Di Maggio & Marco Pagano, 2012.
"Financial Disclosure and Market Transparency with Costly Information Processing,"
EIEF Working Papers Series
1212, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Oct 2012.
- Di Maggio, Marco & Pagano, Marco, 2012. "Financial Disclosure and Market Transparency with Costly Information Processing," CEPR Discussion Papers 9207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco di Maggio & Marco Pagano, 2012. "Financial Disclosure and Market Transparency with Costly Information Processing," CSEF Working Papers 323, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 23 Oct 2013.
- Eden, Maya, 2012. "Should Wall-Street be occupied ? an overlooked price externality of financial intermediation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6059, The World Bank.
- Patrick Bolton & Tano Santos & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2011. "Cream Skimming in Financial Markets," NBER Working Papers 16804, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kartik Anand & James Chapman & Prasanna Gai, 2012. "Covered bonds, core markets, and financial stability," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2012-065, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Thomas Philippon, 2012. "Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation," NBER Working Papers 18077, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stefan Arping, 2013. "Proprietary Trading and the Real Economy," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-032/IV/DSF52, Tinbergen Institute.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.