The Dynamics in Requested and Granted Loan Terms when Bank and Borrower Interact Repeatedly
AbstractThis paper studies how credit constraints develop over bank relationships. I analyze a unique dataset of matched loan application and loan contract information and measure credit constraints as the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts. I find that the most important determinants of receiving smaller than requested loan amounts are firm age and size at the time of the first interaction between borrower and bank. Over loan sequences, credit constraints decease most pronouncedly in the beginning of relationships and for the initially young and small firms. Moreover, the structure of the dataset allows me to disentangle the demand and supply effects behind these observed credit constraints. I find that the gap between requested and granted loan amounts decreases because both sides converge. If previous credit constraints were large, requested amounts increase more moderately, while granted amounts increase more strongly than in the case of small previous constraints. The findings are a sign of the use of dynamic incentives at the bank side to overcome information problems when contracting repeatedly with opaque borrowers. The results further suggest that, particularly in the beginning of a bank relationship, borrowers learn from their previous experience with credit constraints and adjust their demand accordingly.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2010-63.
Date of creation: 2010
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-08-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2010-08-21 (Banking)
- NEP-BEC-2010-08-21 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2010-08-21 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-ENT-2010-08-21 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-MFD-2010-08-21 (Microfinance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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