Does Regulation of Built-In Security Reduce Crime? Evidence From a Natural Experiment
AbstractAs of 1999, all new-built homes in the Netherlands have to have burglary-proof windows and doors. We provide evidence that this large-scale government intervention in the use of self-protective measures lowers crime and improves social welfare. We find the regulatory change to have reduced burglary in new-built homes from 1.1 to 0.8 percent annually, a reduction of 26 percent. The findings suggest that burglars avoid old, less-protected homes that are located in the direct vicinity of the new, better-protected homes. The presence of a negative externality on older homes is ambiguous. We find no evidence for displacement to other property crimes including theft from cars and bicycle theft. Even though the regulation of built-in security does not target preventative measures at homes that are most at risk, the social benefits of the regulation are likely to exceed the social costs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2010-45.
Date of creation: 2010
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victim precaution; government regulation; crime;
Other versions of this item:
- Ben Vollaard & Jan C. van Ours, 2011. "Does Regulation of Built‐in Security Reduce Crime? Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(552), pages 485-504, 05.
- van Ours, Jan C. & Vollaard, Ben, 2010. "Does Regulation of Built-In Security Reduce Crime? Evidence from a Natural Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 7817, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Vollaard, B.A. & Ours, J.C. van, 2010. "Does Regulation of Built-in Security Reduce Crime? Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Discussion Paper 2010-019, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2010-05-02 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-05-02 (Regulation)
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