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Monetary Policy and Excessive Bank Risk Taking

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  • Agur, I.
  • Demertzis, M.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

If monetary policy is to aim at financial stability, how would it change? To analyze this question, this paper develops a general-form model with endogenous bank risk profiles. Policy rates affect both bank incentives to search for yield and the cost of wholesale funding. Financial stability objectives are then shown to make a monetary authority more conservative and more aggressive. Conservative as it sets higher rates on average. And aggressive because, in reaction to negative shocks, cuts are deeper but shorter-lived than otherwise. Keeping cuts short is crucial as bank risk responds primarily to stable low rates. Within the short span, cuts then must be deep to achieve standard objectives.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2010-30S.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:201030s

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Keywords: Monetary policy; Financial stability;

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  1. Farhi, Emmanuel & Tirole, Jean, 2009. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts," TSE Working Papers 09-052, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Oct 2010.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Jokivuolle, Esa & Kiema, Ilkka & Vesala, Timo, 2010. "Credit allocation, capital requirements and output," Research Discussion Papers 17/2010, Bank of Finland.
  2. Landais, Bernard, 2011. "Conduite et efficacité de la politique économique : les leçons de la crise
    [Management and Efficiency of the Economic Policies : The Crisis' Lessons"]
    ," MPRA Paper 31223, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Simona E. Cociuba & Malik Shukayev & Alexander Ueberfeldt, 2012. "Collateralized Borrowing and Risk Taking at Low Interest Rates?," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20121, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
  4. Ekin Ayse Ozsuca & Elif Akbostanci, 2012. "An Empirical Analysis of the Risk Taking Channel of Monetary Policy in Turkey," ERC Working Papers 1208, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Dec 2012.
  5. Wanvimol Sawangngoenyuang & Sukrita Sa-nguanpan & Worawut Sabborriboon, 2012. "Financial Systemic Stability: Challenging Aspects of Central Banks," Working Papers 2012-06, Economic Research Department, Bank of Thailand.
  6. Delis, Manthos D & Hasan, Iftekhar & Mylonidis, Nikolaos, 2011. "The risk-taking channel of monetary policy in the USA: Evidence from micro-level data," MPRA Paper 34084, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Delis, Manthos D. & Kouretas, Georgios P., 2011. "Interest rates and bank risk-taking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 840-855, April.
  8. Simona E. Cociuba & Malik Shukayev & Alexander Ueberfeldt, 2011. "Do Low Interest Rates Sow the Seeds of Financial Crises?," Working Papers 11-31, Bank of Canada.
  9. DellʼAriccia, Giovanni & Laeven, Luc & Marquez, Robert, 2014. "Real interest rates, leverage, and bank risk-taking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 65-99.
  10. Frank Smets, 2014. "Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: How Closely Interlinked?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(2), pages 263-300, June.
  11. Ramayandi, Arief & Rawat, Umang & Tang, Hsiao Chink, 2014. "Can Low Interest Rates be Harmful: An Assessment of the Bank Risk-Taking Channel in Asia," Working Papers on Regional Economic Integration 123, Asian Development Bank.

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