Income Aspirations and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence
AbstractThis article is the first attempt to study the empirical link between income aspirations and cooperation in a one shot public good game. By combining experimental with survey data, we find evidence that the more frustrated people are with their income, the lower is their propensity to cooperate with foreigners and compatriots. The quantitative effect is remarkable: participants who are most frustrated are 46 percent more likely to free-ride on foreigners than those who are satisfied with their income.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2010-23.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
Social Preferences; Aspirations; Cooperation; Maslow;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-05-02 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2010-05-02 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-05-02 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LTV-2010-05-02 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
- NEP-SOC-2010-05-02 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.