Understanding Terrorist Network Topologies and Their Resilience Against Disruption
AbstractThis article investigates the structural position of covert (terrorist or criminal) networks. Using the secrecy versus information tradeoff characterization of covert networks it is shown that their network structures are generally not small-worlds, in contradistinction to many overt social networks. This finding is backed by empirical evidence concerning Jemaah Islamiyah's Bali bombing and a heroin distribution network in New York. The importance of this finding lies in the strength such a topology provides. Disruption and attack by counterterrorist agencies often focuses on the isolation and capture of highly connected individuals. The remarkable result is that these covert networks are well suited against such targeted attacks as shown by the resilience properties of secrecy versus information balanced networks. This provides an explanation of the survival of global terrorist networks and food for thought on counterterrorism strategy policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2009-85.
Date of creation: 2009
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terror networks; terrorist cells; network structure; counterterrorism;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
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- Lindelauf, R. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Husslage, B.G.M., 2011. "Game Theoretic Centrality Analysis of Terrorist Networks: The Cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda," Discussion Paper 2011-107, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks, 2011. "Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering," Working Papers 40, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics.
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