Semi-Public Contests

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Semi-Public Contests

Author Info

Prüfer, J. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Jens Prüfer

Abstract

The process of innovation is driven by two main factors: new inventions and institutions supporting the transformation of inventions into marketable innovations. This paper proposes a new institution, called a semi- public contest, that has been neglected by the economic literature but exists frequently in practice. I show how semi-public contests can mitigate a dilemma that arises at a very early stage of innovative activity and specify the general requirements for situations in which a semi-public contest can increase welfare. This paper's results suggest that governments promote knowledge about the semi-public contest mechanism but refrain from direct public funding of contests.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2009-33.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200933

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Paper
- Prüfer, J., 2008. "Semi-Public Contests," Discussion Paper 2008-023, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2009-05-30 (All new papers)
NEP-CTA-2009-05-30 (Contract Theory & Applications)
NEP-ENT-2009-05-30 (Entrepreneurship)
NEP-INO-2009-05-30 (Innovation)
NEP-IPR-2009-05-30 (Intellectual Property Rights)
NEP-PPM-2009-05-30 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)

References listed on IDEAS
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