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Semi-Public Contests

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  • Prüfer, J.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

The process of innovation is driven by two main factors: new inventions and institutions supporting the transformation of inventions into marketable innovations. This paper proposes a new institution, called a semi- public contest, that has been neglected by the economic literature but exists frequently in practice. I show how semi-public contests can mitigate a dilemma that arises at a very early stage of innovative activity and specify the general requirements for situations in which a semi-public contest can increase welfare. This paper's results suggest that governments promote knowledge about the semi-public contest mechanism but refrain from direct public funding of contests.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2009-33.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200933

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Related research

Keywords: Innovation; Contests; Entrepreneurs; Institutional Design; Business Plan Competitions; Auctions;

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  1. Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2009. "Competition among contests," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(4), pages 743-768.
  2. Kevin Roberts & Leonardo Felli, 2000. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," Economics Series Working Papers 2000-W11, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
  4. Juan Dubra, 2004. "A Correction to Uniqueness in 'Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information'," Game Theory and Information 0409005, EconWPA.
  5. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1007, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  6. GINSBURGH, Victor & van OURS, Jan, 2002. "Expert opinion and compensation: evidence from a musical competition," CORE Discussion Papers 2002033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Biais, Bruno & Perotti, Enrico C, 2003. "Entrepreneurs and New Ideas," CEPR Discussion Papers 3864, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Milgrom, Paul R. & Weber, Robert J., 1983. "Competitive bidding and proprietary information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 161-169, April.
  9. Richard L. Fullerton & Bruce G. Linster & Michael McKee & Stephen Slate, 2002. "Using Auctions To Reward Tournament Winners: Theory and Experimental Investigations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 62-84, Spring.
  10. Campbell, Colin M. & Levin, Dan, 2000. "Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 106-120, March.
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