On Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Game
AbstractWe show that in a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game, a cleaner technology (i.e., a decrease in the emission to output ratio) induces each country to increase its emissions and ultimately can yield a higher level of pollution and reduce social welfare.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2009-23.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
transboundary pollution; technological innovation; differential game;
Other versions of this item:
- Benchekroun, H. & Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2010. "'The Voracity Effect' and Climate Change: The Impact of Clean Technologies," Discussion Paper 2010-97, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Benchekroun, H. & Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2009. "On Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Game," Discussion Paper 2009-014, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-04-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2009-04-13 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2009-04-13 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Philip R. Lane & Aaron Tornell, 1999. "The Voracity Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 22-46, March.
- Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, October.
- Ngo Van Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2004.
"Insecure Property Rights and Growth: The Roles of Appropriation Costs, Wealth Effects, and Heterogeneity,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1253, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ngo Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2006. "Insecure property rights and growth: the role of appropriation costs, wealth effects, and heterogeneity," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 513-529, 08.
- Jorgensen, Steffen & Zaccour, Georges, 2001. "Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(12), pages 1973-1987, December.
- Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
- Scott Barrett, 2006. "Climate Treaties and "Breakthrough" Technologies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 22-25, May.
- Rubio, Santiago J. & Casino, Begona, 2002. "A note on cooperative versus non-cooperative strategies in international pollution control," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 251-261, June.
- Benchekroun, H. & Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2012.
"Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements,"
2012-021, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Benchekroun, H. & Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2012. "Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Discussion Paper 2012-051, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.