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On Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Game

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Author Info

  • Benchekroun, H.
  • Ray Chaudhuri, A.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

We show that in a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game, a cleaner technology (i.e., a decrease in the emission to output ratio) induces each country to increase its emissions and ultimately can yield a higher level of pollution and reduce social welfare.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2009-23.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200923

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

Related research

Keywords: transboundary pollution; technological innovation; differential game;

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References

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  1. Philip R. Lane & Aaron Tornell, 1999. "The Voracity Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 22-46, March.
  2. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, October.
  3. Ngo Van Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2004. "Insecure Property Rights and Growth: The Roles of Appropriation Costs, Wealth Effects, and Heterogeneity," CESifo Working Paper Series 1253, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Jorgensen, Steffen & Zaccour, Georges, 2001. "Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(12), pages 1973-1987, December.
  5. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
  6. Scott Barrett, 2006. "Climate Treaties and "Breakthrough" Technologies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 22-25, May.
  7. Rubio, Santiago J. & Casino, Begona, 2002. "A note on cooperative versus non-cooperative strategies in international pollution control," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 251-261, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Benchekroun, H. & Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2012. "Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Discussion Paper 2012-021, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.

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