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Interval Game Theoretic Division Rules

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  • Brânzei, R.
  • Dall'Aglio, M.
  • Tijs, S.H.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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    Abstract

    Interval bankruptcy problems arise in situations where an estate has to be liquidated among a fixed number of creditors and uncertainty about the amounts of the estate and the claims is modeled by intervals. We extend in the interval setting the classic results by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs [Bankruptcy games, Zeitschrift fur Operations Research, 31 (1987), A 143 { A 159] that characterize division rules which are solutions of the cooperative bankruptcy game.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2008-97.

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    Date of creation: 2008
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    Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200897

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    Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Brânzei, R. & Dimitrov, D.A. & Pickl, S. & Tijs, S.H., 2004. "How to cope with division problems under interval uncertainty of claims?," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-140855, Tilburg University.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:9:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
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