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Beliefs in Network Games (Revised version of CentER DP 2007-46)

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Author Info
Kets, W. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

Networks can have an important effect on economic outcomes. Given the complexity of many of these networks, agents will generally not know their structure. We study the sensitivity of game-theoretic predictions to the specification of players? (common) prior on the network in a setting where players play a fixed game with their neighbors and only have local information on the network structure. We show that two priors are close in a strategic sense if and only if (i) the priors assign similar probabilities to all events that involve a player and his neighbors, and (ii) with high probability, a player believes, given his type, that his neighbors? conditional beliefs are close under the two priors, and that his neighbors believe, given their type, that. . . the conditional beliefs of their neighbors are close, for any number of iterations.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2008-5.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:20085

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology

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  1. Matthew O. Jackson & Leeat Yariv, 2007. "Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 92-98, May.
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  2. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Timothy G. Conley & Christopher R. Udry, 2005. "Learning about a new technology: pineapple in Ghana," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Kajii, Atsushi & Morris, Stephen, 1998. "Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 267-276, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Goolsbee, Austan & Klenow, Peter J, 2002. "Evidence on Learning and Network Externalities in the Diffusion of Home Computers," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 317-43, October.
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  6. Milchtaich, Igal, 2004. "Random-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 353-388, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Fafchamps, Marcel & Lund, Susan, 2003. "Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 261-287, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Population uncertainty and Poisson games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 375-392. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Rothschild, Casey G., 2005. "Payoff continuity in incomplete information games: a comment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 270-274, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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