Big Boss Interval Games
AbstractIn this paper big boss interval games are introduced and various characterizations are given. The structure of the core of a big boss interval game is explicitly described and plays an important role relative to interval-type bi-monotonic allocation schemes for such games. Specifically, each element of the interval core of a big boss interval game is extendable to a bi-monotonic allocation scheme. Furthermore, on the class of big boss interval games two interval solution concepts of value type are defined which can be seen as extensions of the compromise value and the AL-value to the interval setting. It turns out that these interval solutions coincide and generate a bi-monotonic allocation scheme for each big boss interval game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2008-47.
Date of creation: 2008
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Cooperative games; interval data; big boss games; bi-monotonic allocation schemes; the AL-value; the compromise value;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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